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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EDUCATION FOR MINNESOTA'S
SCHOOL CHILDREN: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
BY THE COURT
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
"Equal means getting the same thing,
at the same time,
and in the same place."
-Thurgood
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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following story:
A father has two sons-John andJavier. He says to each that he will
divide his wealth between them equally so that he may spend the
same on each. For John he provides food, clothing, shelter, a car,
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tennis lessons, and pocket money. ForJavier he provides food, clothing, and shelter. Javier says to his father, how is this equal? His father answers: This is exactly equal. I have done an accountable cost
study and learned that a boy does not need a car, tennis lessons, or
pocket money to grow into a fine man. So those costs do not count.
I have provided for you and John equally.l

Correspondingly, in Skeen v. State,2 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held constitutional the ability of a "wealthy" school district 3 to provide
to its students low pupil-staff ratios, 4 superior programs for gifted and
talented students, 5 an active summer school program,6 experienced
teachers, 7 band, orchestra, remedial tutors and elementary counselors, 8 where a low tax base school district lacked the ability to provide
such educational opportunities. 9
Educational opportunities such as those offered by the "wealthy" district are made available to public school students on a discriminatory
basis because of the scheme Minnesota supports in funding its public
schools. Minnesota, like most states, funds its schools primarily with
1. Skeen v. State, Nos. C5-92-677 and C7-92-678, slip op. at 199 (Dist. Ct. Wright
County Mar. 4, 1992), rev'd, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (citing Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362, 516 slip op. at 14-15 (Tex. 250thJud. Dist. Sept. 24, 1990)).
2. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
3. The trial court compared the educational opportunities available in the Edina
School District, which is a high tax-base district, with those available in the Elk River
School District, a low tax-base district. Skeen, slip op. at 113. The two districts are comparable in size. Id.
4. The trial court found that there were significant differences in pupil staff ratios
between Edina and Elk River. For fiscal year 1988-89, Edina had a 15.4:1 ratio while Elk
River maintained a 17.0:1 ratio. Id. at 113-14. To match Edina's ratio, Elk River would
require 36.5 additional staff members. Id. at 114.
5. Edina had twice the staff for its gifted and talented program as Elk River. Id.
For fiscal year 1988-89, Edina spent $196,000 for their gifted and talented programs,
while Elk River spent $90,000. Id.
6. The trial court emphasized the importance of summer school by stating that
"[s]ummer school is ... an important element of educational opportunity because it
helps students to maintain continuity, is critical for slow learners and students with
retention problems, and provides other students with exploration experiences." Skeen,
slip op. at 114. Edina served 448 students in its summer program. Id. By contrast, Elk
River offered a very limited summer program for special education students because of
scarce resources. Id.
7. Elk River hired teachers with average teaching experience of 1.5 years while
Edina was able to hire teachers with an average of 4.4 years of teaching experience. Id.
at 115.
8. Fifth grade band, elementary orchestra, remedial tutors, and elementary counselors were offered in the Edina school district but were not available in the Elk River
school district. Id. at 116.
9. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320. The trial court concluded its comparison of the
Edina and Elk River school districts by citing the testimony of the Elk River Superintendent who indicated that, because of financial constraints, the children in Elk River were
receiving an education inferior to that of Edina students at all levels. Skeen, slip op. at
117.
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revenue raised from property taxes. 10 A system of school financing
based on local property taxes creates disparity in the amount of funding available for education of the students who attend school in high
property tax districts compared with the amount of funding available
to students who attend school in lower property tax districts." This
revenue disparity adversely affects the quality of education and, thus,
the educational opportunity for children residing in low property tax
school districts.12 As the district court in Skeen found, "[t] hese disparities place school children on an unequal footing dependent upon the
property wealth of their school districts, in their pursuit of higher education, job opportunities, and other competitive aspects of adult
life."13
Despite overwhelming factual evidence demonstrating the inequalities between school districts, 14 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in
Skeenl 5 that Minnesota's system of educational finance satisfies the
state constitutional requirement that the legislature "provide a 'general and uniform system of education' to all students in the state."16
The court further held that education is a fundamental right under
the Minnesota Constitution.17 However, the court separated the fundamental right to education from the system of education financing
for the purpose of its analysis.18 Consequently, the court ruled that,
because plaintiffs receive an adequate education, the fundamental
right to education is satisfied under strict scrutiny analysis.1 9 The
court, however, applied a rational basis standard of review to the
State's system of educational finance2 0 to rule that the system is constitutional in its present form.21
This Comment evaluates the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in
Skeen both in light of our nation's history of school finance reform and,
particularly, with respect to the Minnesota Constitution. Part II sets
forth the principles of education finance, provides historical context
for education finance litigation, and evaluates the education and equal
protection clauses of the Minnesota Constitution. Part III outlines the
10. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
11. Skeen, slip op. at 93-94.
12. Skeen, slip op. at 94.
13. Id.
14. The trial court's decision is supported by 409 paragraphs of factual findings
and 50 "summary findings." See Skeen, slip op. at 1-140. Further, the court heard extensive testimony from 35 witnesses and examined more than 450 exhibits. Id. at 1.
15. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
16. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320.
17. Id. at 313.
18. Id. at 315.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 316.
21. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320.
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facts and the court's analysis in Skeen. Part IV examines the court's
constitutional interpretation of the education clause, the court's equal
protection analysis and resulting misapplication of different standards
of judicial review, and predicts the social effect of the Skeen ruling.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE LAW

Principlesof Education Finance
1.

Overview

Generally, state courts characterize education as a state, not a local,
function. 22 To meet their states' educational needs, state legislatures
have devised complex formulas and methodologies for education
funding.23 For example, the Supreme Court of Montana stated in a
recent school finance suit, Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v.
State,24 that "[t]he six-week-long trial included extensive evidence and
testimony about the complex combination of federal, state, and local
sources through which Montana's public elementary and secondary
schools are funded."25 In almost all states, school districts are funded
through a mix of local tax revenues and grants from the state govern22. See ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 93 (1968).

Wise notes that nearly all state constitutions

contain articles related to the establishment of schools, thus supporting the concept
that education is a state function. Id. at 97. Further, the language employed in the
state constitutions suggests legislatures are under either a requirement or a duty to
provide education. See id. This obligation is binding on the state and not on individual
districts within the states. Id. at 98.
The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the education clauses of many state
constitutions have been interpreted to make education a state responsibility, rather
than a local responsibility. SeePauleyv. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 869 & n.22 (W. Va. 1979).
23. For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho described Idaho's complex system of
school funding in a recent school finance reform case, Idaho School for Equal Education
Opportunity v. Evans, as follows:
Public schools in Idaho are funded by a combination of local, state, and federal funds. The State partially or totally reimburses the districts for certain
expenses (80% of costs of exceptional education personnel; 85% of transportation costs; and 100% of teacher retirement benefits, Social Security, and unemployment insurance). Money is also received from the State Educational
Support Program. This program is funded by state revenues, allocated by a
"support unit" formula and based on average daily attendance in the district.
Each school district's portion is reduced by a projected "local contribution"
equal to the money which would be collected by a .36% property tax levy by
the school district .... The school district may also, with voter approval, raise
more money through supplemental levies. . . . Finally, a relatively small
amount of a school district's budget comes from lottery proceeds and various
federal programs.
850 P.2d 724, 728-29 (Idaho 1993).
24. 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
25. Id. at 686.
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ment. 26 Minnesota's funding scheme is no less complex than those of
other states.
2. Minnesota
Minnesota seeks to balance the competing interests of equality, efficiency, and limited local control in the finance of education. 27 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota has expressly stated that while
"[r] ecognizing the existence of a limited local interest in the matter of
education, this court so frequently has affirmed the doctrine that the
maintenance of the public schools is a matter of state and not of local
concern .
"28 Therefore, the funds raised for education are state
funds, not local funds.29
The Minnesota State Legislature has established school districts to
assess and collect taxes for education purposes.0 Minnesota school
districts receive operating and capital revenue from two primary
sources: 1) "basic revenue," also known as "foundation revenue," provided by the state;3 1 and 2) property tax levies imposed on the property tax-base of each district. 32 Basic revenue is distributed by the state
26. See THE

RAND CORPORATION, SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION: THE COURTS AND

EDUCATIONAL REFORM 35 (John Pincus ed., 1974) [hereinafter SCHOOL FINANCE IN
TRANS.IsON].

27. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 318.
28. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Erickson, 190 Minn. 216, 222, 251 N.W. 519, 521
(1933); see also Board of Educ. v. Houghton, 181 Minn. 576, 580, 233 N.W. 834, 835
(1930) (stating "[t]he maintenance of public schools is a matter, not of local, but of
state concern."); Board of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 417 (1871) (ruling that "[t]he
management of the public schools is one branch of the state government, for which
within the limits of this district they are incorporated . . ").
29. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gold v. Dunne, 421 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Mo. 1967) (stating
"funds of school districts are the property of the state, and not the private property of
the school districts"); see also, WISE, supra note 25, at 106-09 (analyzing case law supporting the proposition that school taxes are state taxes).
30. See In re Collection of Personal Property Taxes for 1922, 159 Minn. 200, 202,
198 N.W. 457, 457 (1924) (stating that "[t]he administrative basis of our public school
system is the school district maintained chiefly by local taxation.").
For cases affirming the right of the legislature to establish school districts, see
Muehring v. School Dist. No. 31, 224 Minn. 432, 435, 28 N.W.2d 655, 657 (1947) (holding that the legislature may establish public agencies for the purpose of discharging its
constitutional duty to provide a general and uniform system of public schools and to
provide a thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township in the
state); State ex rel. Klimek v. School Dist. No. 70, 204 Minn. 279, 282, 283 N.W. 397, 399
(1939) (stating that "[iut is well settled that school districts are governmental agencies
established by legislative authority to perform the duties of educating the children of
the state.").
31. Sheen, slip op. at 15-16. The state aid is derived from revenue attributed to state
sales tax and income tax. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 16.
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to each school district on a "per pupil unit" basis33 if the school district
imposes a specified property tax rate. 34 Under a system called "equalization," the state will make up the difference between the revenues
raised from local property taxes and the guaranteed minimum level of
per-pupil funding.3 5 Approximately ninety-three percent of general
education revenue 3 6 was equalized by the state; approximately seven
7
percent of funding was left to local control.3
The seven percent nonequalized portion is also funded by two levies
on the local school district tax-base: the referendum levy and the debt
service levy.3 8 The referendum levy comprises 6.3% of the seven percent.3 9 Minnesota specifically allows school districts to increase reve40
nues over the basic revenue formula by use of the referendum levy.
Similarly, debt service levies are also based on the local property taxbase and are used to finance bonds used for construction or renovation of schools.4 1 For both the referendum levy and the debt service

levy, school district voters must approve a specified increase in their
33. The funding mechanism which is calculated on a per pupil basis endeavors to
weight students pursuant to differing costs of education. MINN. STAT. § 124.17 (1992)
defines a "pupil unit" as follows: Kindergarten students are weighted at .5 pupil units;
elementary students are weighted at 1.0 pupil units; and secondary students are
weighted at 1.3 pupil units. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 304.
34. "The basic revenue for each district equals the formula allowance times the
actual pupil units for the school year." MINN. STAT. § 124A.22, subd. 2 (1992 & Supp.
1993).
The state requires that school districts use a specified percentage-26.3% at the
time of trial-of their tax capacity (adjusted net tax capacity) for education. Skeen, 505
N.W.2d at 305. This rate is referred to as the "general education tax rate." See MINN.
STAT. § 124A.23, subd. 1.
The basic revenue level or "formula allowance" was $2,953 per pupil unit at the
time of the Skeen trial. This amount has been increased by the State Legislature to
$3,050 for fiscal years 1992-94 and $3,150 for fiscal year 1995. MINN. STAT. § 124A.22,
subd. 2. See also Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 304-05.
35. MINN. STAT. § 124A.23, subd. 4 (1992). School districts with a small property
tax-base will not be able to raise adequate revenue from the local property tax levies
and thus will receive a larger amount of state aid. Conversely, school districts with a
wealthy tax-base will raise more funds from the property tax levies and thus require less
aid from the state to meet the guaranteed minimum of per-pupil funding. See Skeen, slip
op. at 16.
A few school districts in Minnesota are "off the formula." This occurs when a district raises $2,953, the guaranteed minimum at the time of trial, using a levy rate less
than the required rate of 26.3%. Id. at 17.
36. General education revenue for each district is composed of basic revenue, compensatory education revenue, training and experience revenue, secondary sparsity revenue, elementary sparsity revenue, and supplemental revenue. MINN. STAT. § 124A.22,
subd. 1 (1992).
37. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 306.
38. Skeen, slip op. at 18-19.
39. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 306.
40.
41.

MINN. STAT. § 124A.03 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
MINN. STAT. § 124.97 (1992).
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property taxes which is then used to finance school operations.42 During the 1990-91 fiscal year, use of the referendum levy resulted in a
4
range from zero to $4,194 per pupil unit. 3
B. History of Education Finance Litigation
1.

Federal Claims

The historic 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education44 focused our national attention on the importance
of education. The Court eloquently stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
45
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
The Brown decision sought to eliminate discrimination in education
based on race. 46 School finance reform litigation seeks to eliminate
discrimination in education based upon residence and wealth of the
local school district. Common to both Brown and Skeen, however, is the
issue of equal educational opportunity.
The definition of equal educational opportunity sets the parameters
of the controversy. Various definitions have been proposed, most of
which focus on the allocation of educational resources. 4 7 One definition, for example, contends that "[e] quality of educational opportunity
exists when a child's educational opportunity does not depend upon
either his parents' economic circumstances or his location within the
state."48 Some states incorporate this ideal by defining equal opportunity education as the guarantee that every child receives a minimum
level of education, expressed as the funding to be spent per pupil.49
42. MINN. STAT. § 124A.03, subd. 2 (1992 & Supp. 1993).

43.
44.
45.
46.

Respondents' Brief at 4, Skeen (Nos. C5-92-677 and C7-92-678).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
Id.
47. WISE, supra note 25, at 143. See also SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSiON, supra note
29, at 82-84 (discussing the meaning of equal educational opportunity).
48. WISE, supra note 25, at 146.
49. Id. at 149.
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School finance reform litigation challenges the state's definition of
equal opportunity education that underlies the scheme the state employs to finance its public schools. Almost all states raise education
funds through property tax levies. 50 Because school districts with high
property tax-bases can raise more revenue than districts with low property tax-bases, wealth effectively determines school funding.51
Although this often is mitigated by various state equalization plans,
school funding "still varies widely between property-rich and propertypoor districts."52 The inequities that result from the funding dispari53
ties ultimately lead to school finance reform litigation.
School finance reform has been litigated in both the federal and
state courts. Claims filed in federal courts are based on the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution54 while claims filed in
state courts are based on the state constitutions' equal protection and
education clauses. 55
a. FederalEqual Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that individuals similarly situated will be similarly treated by the government. 56 The
federal courts have endeavored "to establish a federal equal protection
standard that fairly balances the interests of the government and the
interests of individuals." 57 The Court has developed three standards of
review for equal protection analysis: rational basis, intermediate scru58
tiny, and strict scrutiny.
i.

Rational Basis Standard

In matters concerning general economic regulation and social welfare, the Court traditionally grants significant deference to the legislature. 59 Applying a rational basis standard of review, the Court asks
50. See supra part II.A.1.
51. William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School FinanceReform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1647-48 (1989).

52. Id. at 1648.
53. See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv.

L. REv. 1072, 1074 (1991).
54. SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 29, at 88.
55. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
56. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrru-IoNAL LAw 570 (4th ed.
1991).
57. Ann L. Jijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulations" or "New Articulations"?,20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 337, 338 (1994).
58. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 574-76.
59. Id. at 574-75.
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only whether the legislation rationally furthers a legitimate governmental purpose.6O
ii. Intermediate Scrutiny
Less deferential to the legislature than the rational basis standard,
an intermediate level of scrutiny asks whether the legislation is substantially related to an important governmental objective. 61 This heightened level of scrutiny has thus far been applied by the Court in review
6 2
of gender and illegitimacy classifications.
iii. Strict Scrutiny
Strict judicial scrutiny is applied by the Court when legislation "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution
...."63 Under the strict scrutiny standard, the Court asks whether the
challenged legislation is narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling
governmental interest. 64
b.

The Equal Protection Standard of Review for School Finance
Litigation

The success of equal protection claims in school finance litigation
turns on how closely the court scrutinizes the state's financing scheme.
Litigants have invoked strict scrutiny by asserting that the state's financing scheme impinges on the fundamental right to education or
classifies individuals on the basis of wealth, thus creating a suspect
classification.
In the seminal case, Serrano v. Priest,65 the California Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the disparities in educational opportunity that
resulted from unequal school district property tax-bases. 66 In Serrano,
the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Federal Equal Protection
Clause. 67 The California Supreme Court held that education is a fun60. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). See generally
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. NewYork, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (holding that the restriction of advertising on vehicles is related to the safety of traffic flow).
61. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
62. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 576.
63. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
64. See generally NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 575.
65. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
66. Id. at 1244.
67. Id. at 1249. The case also alleged that the California financing scheme violated
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. Id. at 1249 n. 11. The court
noted that the California equal protection clause was construed as "substantially the
equivalent" of the Federal Equal Protection Clause. Id. Thus, the court's analysis with
regard to the Fourteenth Amendment also applied to the California equal protection
clause. Id.
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damental interest6s and that classification based on wealth violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.69 The court stated "we have determined that
[the California] funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the
poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of
70
the wealth of his parents and neighbors."
After Serrano, more than thirty school finance reform suits were filed
in state and federal courts alleging equal protection violation. 71 One
of the cases, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,72 was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court to determine whether
the Fourteenth Amendment applied to state school finance laws. 73 In
Rodriguez, the Texas school financing system was challenged in a class
action brought on behalf of poor families residing in school districts
with low property tax-bases. 74 The three-judge federal district court
found that the financing system was unconstitutional. 75 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the Texas school financing scheme did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 The five-to-four majority held that education is not "fundamental" as a matter of federal constitutional law. 77 The Court based its
conclusion on the grounds that a right to education is neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 78 Further, the discrimination among school districts based on property wealth was not
constitutionally "suspect."79 Because a fundamental interest or suspect
class was not at issue, the Court did not apply a strict scrutiny analysis.8o Rather, the Court employed the rational basis standard for review and found that discrimination against children in poor school
districts had only to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 8 '
68. Id. at 1258. The court based its determination on the following five factors: (1)
education is essential for competing in the economic marketplace; (2) education is
universally relevant; (3) education continues over a lengthy period of time; (4) education shapes a child's personal development; and (5) education is compulsory. Id. at
1258-59.
69. Id. at 1255.
70. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244.
71.

SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 29, at 87.

72. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 54-55.
77. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28. The court noted that wealth was not a suspect class and that the plaintiffs merely comprised a large, amorphous group whose only commonality was residence in certain tax districts. The class challenging the system did not share any of the
factors traditionally defining a suspect class: lack of political power, disabilities, or a
history of purposeful unequal treatment. Id.
80. Id. at 40.
81. Id. at 55.
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After the Rodriguez decision, it would seem that school finance reform litigation would simply cease to exist. However, the Rodriguez decision was based solely on the Federal Constitution; no state
constitutional issues were raised.8 2 Instead of closing the door on
school finance reform litigation, Rodriguez merely shifted the forum to
state courts. As one commentator urged, "[i] t is now up to the states to
evaluate for themselves the nature, function, and importance of public
education and the legality, under state constitutions, of discrimination
in how it is provided."83
2.

State Claims

Both the education clause and the equal protection clause of a state
constitution provide claimants with a theory to attack disparities in educational opportunity.8 4 To date, twenty-seven states have addressed
the issue of school finance reform. Fifteen states have rejected constitutional challenges to their school financing schemes8 5 while the remaining twelve states have found their school financing systems
82. SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 29, at 96.
83. Id.
84. One commentator argues that "state educational clauses, rather than equal
protection clauses, offer the strongest theoretical basis for seeking court-imposed education reform." See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School FinanceReform
Litigation, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991). Factors supporting the preference of
state education clause over the equal protection clause include: 1) lack of tension with
federal law; 2) relation to issues of education specifically; 3) no requirement to prove
the nexus between dollars spent and education received because the system of education
is usually required to be "equal" or "uniform" not the education itself; and 4) an argument can be made that the education system falls below a minimum standard. Id. at
315-17.
The education clause does not always prevail as the theory of precedence. See, e.g.,
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152 (Tenn. 1993). After an
in-depth analysis of the Tennessee state education clause, the McWherter court recently
decided to rest its decision solely on the state equal protection clause stating that
"[b]ecause... the plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the equal protection provisions
of the state constitution, the precise level of education mandated by [the education
clause] and the extent, if any, to which the system does not comport with the education
clause need not be determined at this time." Id.
85. Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Wisconsin have
rejected constitutional challenges to their school financing schemes. See Shofstall v.
Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking,
537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Illinois ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (I11.App. Ct.
1976); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v.
Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993);
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.
1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa.
1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
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unconstitutional under either the education clause86 or equal protection clause.87
a.

Education Clauses of State Constitutions

The constitutions of all fifty states contain an education clause.8 8
Typically, education clauses refer to the establishment, funding and
standards of the state public schools.8 9 With regard to the legislature's
duty, education clauses are worded either generally or specifically. 90 A
general clause simply states that the legislature is responsible to establish and maintain a system of public schools. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution states "it shall be the duty of legislatures ... to
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences and all seminaries of
them; especially ... public schools and grammar schools .. .
School financing was recently challenged again in Idaho. The plaintiffs alleged
that the current system of funding was unconstitutional because it did not provide uniform or thorough education. See Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850
P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993). The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and
held that the equal protection and uniformity claims were decided adversely to the
plaintiffs in the 1975 case, Thompson v. Engelking. Id. at 729 (citing Thompson, 537 P.2d
at 635). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the Thompson precedent disposed of the
uniformity issue. Id. at 734. The court, however, ruled that Thompson did not address
the "thoroughness" provision of the Idaho Constitution and thus reversed the trial
court and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. Id. at 736.
86. Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Texas, Washington and West
Virginia have found their school funding schemes unconstitutional pursuant to their
state constitution's education clause. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. v.
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); and Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
87. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Tennessee, and Wyoming have found their
state funding schemes unconstitutional under their state constitution equal protection
clause. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill,
486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139
(Tenn. 1993); and Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
88. McUsic, supra note 84, at 311. Because the Mississippi Constitution is susceptible of conflicting interpretations, the existence of an education clause is in dispute. Id.
at 311 n.5.
89. Id. at 311.
90. Education clauses have been analyzed and grouped into four categories as
follows:
(1) weak clauses, which merely call for the establishment of public schools, (2)
thorough and efficient clauses, which emphasize the quality of education, (3)
clauses which call for advancing education by 'all suitable means' or which
contain purposive preambles, and (4) clauses which term education 'paramount' and impose specific duties on the states.
See McUsic, supra note 84, at 309 n.4 (citing Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The
Right to BilingualEducation, 9 HI-tv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 66-70 (1974)).
91. MAss. CoNsT. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2.
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More specific charges, on the other hand, usually include explicit
words such as "equality," "uniform," and "efficient" to describe the system of public schools. The New Jersey Constitution requires the legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public
*..."92
schools .
Decisions by state supreme courts that address alleged violations of
equal educational opportunity based on their state's education clauses
are inconsistent. 93 In large part, this is due to the particular language
of individual state constitutions.94 Some states have upheld their
school funding schemes based on their education clause while others
have found their funding schemes unconstitutional. The Colorado
Supreme Court ruled that the state constitutional requirement of a
"thorough and uniform system of free public schools" mandated equal
educational opportunities but did not mandate equal educational expenditures per pupil.9 5 Conversely, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that the "thorough and efficient" portion of the NewJersey Constitution's education clause was violated by the inferior quality of education in poor urban school districts as compared to other school
96
districts within the state.

92. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1 1 (1947).
93. Thro, supra note 51, at 1642.
94. See, e.g., McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 148.
95. Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982). See also
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 653 (Idaho 1975) (holding that "general, uniform and thorough system" of public schools did not require equal educational opportunities); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that a
requirement for the "maintenance and support of a system of free schools" only requires "sound basic education"); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio
1979) (holding that a "thorough and efficient" education, as required by the Ohio Constitution, necessitates only that students not be deprived of "educational opportunity");
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 365 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a "thorough and efficient"
education was provided if the education was adequate, minimum or basic).
96. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990). See also Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (stating that "[t]he system of common schools must be substantially uniform throughout the state" and holding that the
constitutional mandate to establish an efficient educational system throughout the state
was violated); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989)
(ruling that discrepancies in spending translated into unequal educational opportunities that violated the constitutional mandate of equality of educational opportunity);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (holding that the
constitutional requirement to "establish and make suitable provision for the support
and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools" will not tolerate significant wealth-based funding disparities among schools).
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Equal Protection Clauses of State Constitutions

As noted previously, public school finance reform cases were
brought under the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 97 After Rodriguez,
however, claims of inadequate education were often based on a state's
guarantee of equality for its citizens rather than the federal equal protection assurances. 9 8 Because most state constitutions do not contain
explicit equal protection clauses, claimants are forced to rely on other
equality guarantee provisions9 9 that provide the same effect as the Federal Equal Protection Clause.100
School finance plaintiffs prefer bringing claims under state equal
protection clauses because the state clauses are often interpreted more
broadly than their federal counterpart, allowing state courts additional
flexibility in their analysis of fundamental rights and suspect classifications.1tO To be successful, however, state equal protection claims, like
federal claims, generally require that education be declared a fundamental right or that wealth be declared a suspect class.102 Moreover,
the success of school finance claims turns on the level of scrutiny each
state court chooses to apply.
1.

Education as a Fundamental Right under State Constitutions

Generally, state courts have looked to the education clause embodied in their state constitutions to determine whether education is a
fundamental right.103 The Wyoming Supreme Court, for example,
97. For a discussion of federal claims based on the equal protection clause, see supra
part II.B.1.
98. Thro, supra note 51, at 1641-42.
99. For purposes of this comment, a "state equality guarantee provision" hereinafter will be referred to as a "state equal protection clause".
100. Thro, supra note 51, at 1641-42. See also McUsic, supra note 84, at 312.
101. See, e.g., McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 152 (stating that, "[i]n the interpretation of
the Tennessee Constitution, this Court is always free to expand the minimum level of
protection mandated by the federal constitution.") (citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d
834, 838 (Tenn. 1988)).
102. McUsic, supra note 84, at 313. But see McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 155 (finding the
state funding scheme unconstitutional under state equal protection clause without determining whether education is a fundamental right); see also Du Pree v. Alma Sch. Dist.
No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
103. McUsic, supra note 84, at 318 n.43. McUsic notes:
In general, courts use a number of approaches in finding a fundamental right
based on the education clause. Most courts find a fundamental right by examining the education clause itself, its relationship to the constitution as a whole,
and constitutional history to determine whether the document itself implies
and the framers intended education to be a fundamental right.
Id.
Other courts have followed the Rodriguez test. Thus, if there is an express provision
of the constitution regarding education, then education will be deemed a fundamental
right. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33. The education clause is one such express provision.
Id. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that education was a funda-
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noted that "[i] n light of the emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution
places on education, there is no room for any conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental interest."104 In addition, several other states, have recognized education as
0
a fundamental right.1 5
2.

Standard of Review

The level of scrutiny that states apply to school finance claims
brought under their equal protection clauses was recently examined by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Tennessee Small School Systems v.
McWherter.1 0 6 As McWherter indicated, the policy of "local control" over
operation of public schools is the reason most often cited by the courts
to satisfy the legitimate state interest under a rational basis of review.10 7
Interestingly, the McWherter court, without deciding whether education
is a fundamental right, held that Tennessee's school finance scheme
was unconstitutional under the rational basis test of judicial review.1 0 8
The court stated, "[w] e conclude that the better reasoned opinions are
those which have rejected the argument that local control is justification for disparity in opportunity."1 09 The court further stated that it
does not follow that "if the state asserts its constitutional duty to maintain and support a public school system, the state must exercise complete control over the system."110
C.

Minnesota Constitution

The plaintiffs in Skeen v. State"11 alleged that Minnesota's school
funding scheme violated the education clause and the equal protecmental right because it is expressly provided for in the constitution within the education clause. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
104. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
105. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989);
Herschler, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 90 (Wash. 1978).
106. 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
107. Id. at 154. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 102223 (Colo. 1982) (stating that the legitimate state purpose was "control of the locally
elected school board by the voters in the district); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359, 366 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that "[t] he justification offered by the State-the preservation and promotion of local control of education-is both a legitimate State interest
and one to which the present financing system is reasonably related"); Kukor v. Grover,
436 N.W.2d 568, 580-81 (Wis. 1989) (holding that the principle of local control is constitutionally based and, thus, the present finance scheme met the rational basis test).
108. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 155. See also Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
109. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 154.
110. Id. at 155.
111. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
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tion clause of the Minnesota Constitution.'12 In order to fully evaluate
the plaintiffs' claim and the appropriateness of the court's decision,
the constitutional history and Minnesota case law of both the education clause and the equal protection clause must be briefly analyzed.
1.

Education Clause

The Minnesota Constitution provides that:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to
establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure
a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the
3
state.1 1
The Constitutional Convention Debates of 1858 provide insight into
the history of the education clause. The proposed Republican version
stated: "The legislature shall ... establish a system of common schools
which shall be nearly uniform as practicable."' 14 The proposed Democratic proposal read: "It shall be the duty of the Legislature . . . to
establish a general system of public schools." 1 15 Neither proposal,
however, contained the present language of "general and uniform" to
describe the system of public schools.116 The final version of the Constitution divided the education clause in two sections. The first section
addressed the uniform system of public schools and the second section
outlined the financing of such schools.11 7
Minnesota's education clause places an affirmative duty on the legislature to create and maintain a general and uniform system of public
schools.11 8 In 1871, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the public school system is "to ensure a regular method
throughout the state, whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens
112. Id. at 301-02.
113. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
114. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 309.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Fred Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.
MrCHELL L. REV. 287 (1994). The final version of § I of the education clause read:
"Uniform system of public schools. The stability of a republican form of government
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools." MINN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1 (1857).
The final version of § 3 read: "Public schools in each township to be established.
The legislature shall make such provisions, by taxation or otherwise, as, with the income
arising from the school fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of public
schools in each township in the state." MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1857).
118. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Erickson, 190 Minn. 216, 216, 251 N.W. 519, 521
(1933).
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of the republic."'119 A few years later, in 1878, the supreme court ruled
in Curyer v. Merll2o that the education clause did not require absolute uniformity.121
2. Equal Protection Clause
The Minnesota Constitution provides in relevant part that: No mem-

ber of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of
the land or the judgment of his peers. 122
a.

Standards of Review

Both the Minnesota and Federal Constitutions "require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law."123 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "the standard applied to claims
brought under the state equal protection clause.., is the same as that
applied to claims brought under the federal equal protection clause
...."124 Thus, the court must employ a strict scrutiny analysis where a
statute operates to limit a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class.12 5 Absent a fundamental right or suspect
119. Board of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (1871).
120. 25 Minn. 1 (1878).
121. Id. at 6. The issue before the court was whether the State could require all
public schools to purchase textbooks from a specific publisher but exclude all independent and special school districts. Id. The court stated:
The rule of uniformity contemplated by this constitutional provision which
the legislature is required to observe, has reference to the system which it may
provide, and not to the district organizations that may be established under it.
These may differ in respect to size, grade, corporate powers and franchises, as
may seem to the legislature best, under different circumstances and conditions; but the principle of uniformity is not violated, if the system which is
adopted is made to have a general and uniform application to the entire state,
so that the same grade or class of public schools may be enjoyed by all localities similarly situated ....
Id.
122. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 2. Note that the Minnesota Constitution does not guarantee the equal protection of the laws under a single provision as does the Federal
Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I with
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. See In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 310 (Minn. 1986); see also Bernthal v. City of
St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1985) (stating that "the equal protection guarantees are the same under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota
Constitution").
Note that the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution does not contain a similarly worded provision.
See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 896 n.1 (Minn. 1991).
124. AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 and 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 569 n.Il
(Minn. 1983) (citations omitted).
125. Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1983).
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classification, the court will apply a rational basis test of judicial
26

review.1
In addition to the strict scrutiny and rational basis standards, Minnesota has adopted a third standard of review. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has applied a rational basis test that is less deferential to the
legislature than is required under the federal counterpart. 127 In State
v. Russell,128 the court applied the following rational basis test:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural
and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to
the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection
between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed
remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state
29
can legitimately attempt to achieve.'
At issue in Russell was a facially neutral statute that was alleged to be
discriminatory in effect against African-Americans.13 0 The statute imposed harsher penalties for use of crack cocaine than powder cocaine.13 1 The trial court found that crack cocaine is used
predominately by African-Americans and powder cocaine is used predominately by whites.132 As a result, the trial court concluded that African-Americans suffered harsher penalties for cocaine use. 133 The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
statute violated the equal protection clause, stating that "the correlation between race and the use of cocaine base or powder and the gross
disparity in resulting punishment cries out for closer scrutiny of the
challenged laws."' 34 The court found the legislation to be unconstitutional because of its discriminatory effect.135
Justice Wahl, writing for the majority, addressed the difference between the Minnesota and federal rational basis standards, stating:
This court has not been consistent in explaining whether the rational
basis standard under Minnesota law, although articulated differently,
126. Id.
127. Russell 477 N.W.2d at 888-89. In Russell, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that a statute that punished crack cocaine users more severely than powder cocaine
users violated the equal protection rights of the African-American defendants. Id. at
889. For a detailed analysis of Minnesota's "rational basis with teeth" standard of review, see lijima, supra note 57, at 359-70.
128. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
129. Id. at 888.
130. Id. at 887.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
134. Id. at 888 n.2.
135. Id. at 891.
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is identical to the federal standard or represents a less deferential
standard under the Minnesota Constitution. What has been consistent, however, is that in the cases where we have applied what may be
characterized as the Minnesota rationalbasis analysis, we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis tojustify a classification, as the
more deferential federal standard requires. Instead, we have required a reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the
theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory
goals.

1 36

Subsequent Minnesota courts have continued to struggle with the
appropriate standard of review to apply in equal protection challenges
under the Minnesota Constitution.S7 The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the Russell three-factor rational basis test to legislation
that classified individuals based on age and held that such legislation
did not violate Minnesota's equal protection clause. 1 38 Conversely, the
supreme court declined to apply the three-part Russell test in controversies concerning state economic legislationt39 and in a case involving
the state judicial electoral ballot.140
136. Id. at 889 (emphasis added) (citing Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational
Relation Test: The Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 709, 726
(1984)).
Justice Simonett concurred specially to clarify the court's equal protection analysis.
Russel4 477 N.W.2d at 893 (Simonett, J., concurring). Justice Simonett asked: "What,
then, is the equal protection test under our state constitution? A majority of this court
now returns to the three-factor uniformity clause test. I assume, therefore, this is now
our equal protection test." Id. at 894 (emphasis added). Justice Simonett concluded:
I would hold that where a facially neutral criminal statute has, in its general
application, a substantial discriminatory racial impact, this court may then apply its three-factor rational basis test, even though there is no showing that the
legislature intended this impact. It seems to me the critical importance of
racial equality in our multicultural society warrants this closely tailored
modification.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Coyne dissented, stating that the court was engaging in "an activist form of
judicial review which allows the court to substitute its view ... for that of the legislature." Id. at 895 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993); see also Clabo v. BorSon Constr. Co., 481 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Minn. 1992) (applying the rational basis standard
of review to uphold provision of workers' compensation law).
138. Backdahl v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 479 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). The challenged legislation in Backdahl provided for a longer period of revocation of a driver's license for minors who failed an alcohol concentration test. Citing
Russell, the appellate court stated: "The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized an
independent Minnesota constitutional standard for reviewing challenges brought
under our state constitution's equivalent to the federal equal protection clause."
Backdahl 479 N.W.2d at 91. The court upheld the legislation based on the three-part
rational basis test. Id. at 92.
139. SeeJohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 497 N.W.2d
250 (Minn. 1993); Clabo v. Bor-son Constr. Co., 481 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 1992).
140. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1992).
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Education as a FundamentalRight Under the Minnesota
Constitution

In addition to departing from federal law with respect to rational
basis review, Minnesota departs from federal law with respect to the
issue of education as a fundamental right.14 1 The United States
Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution.14 2 Minnesota case law, however,
clearly authorizes the courts to provide greater protection under the
Minnesota Constitution than the Federal Constitution.1 43 The Minnesota Supreme Court exercised that authority in Skeen v. State, a case of
first impression on the issue of education as a fundamental right under
the Minnesota Constitution.144
III.

A.

SKFN V. STATE

The Facts

The plaintiffs in this action were fifty-two Minnesota Independent
School Districts,145 characterized as outer-ring suburban or rural
school districts with tax-bases lower than those of the intervenor districts.146

Defendants in the case were the State of Minnesota, the Min-

141. Fundamental rights have been defined by the Minnesota Supreme Court as
"[t]hose which have their origin in the express terms of the constitution or which are
necessarily to be implied from those terms." State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.
1987) (quoting BLAcK's LAw DicrioNARY 607 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979)). See also Michael K.
Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray" Area: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota
Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 383 (1994).
142. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
143. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987).
144. School finance reform litigation, however, is not new to Minnesota. In 1971,
plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court alleging that the Minnesota system of
financing public schools, which made spending per pupil a function of the school district's wealth, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870, 871-72 (D. Minn. 1971). The court ruled that the right to education was a
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 875. Further, the court stated
that "[ t ] he level of spending for publicly financed education in Minnesota is profoundly
affected by the wealth of each school district. Children living in districts poorer than
the richest are proportionately disadvantaged." Id. at 873. The decision was overruled
by Rodriguez in March, 1973. SeeRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1. Following the historical trend
in school finance reform, the litigation involving Minnesota's funding scheme has
shifted forum from the federal court to the state court.
145. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993). The plaintiffs represented
approximately 25% of the total enrollment for kindergarten through grade 12. Id.
146. Id. The majority of the plaintiff districts belong to the Association of Stable and
Growing School Districts. Id. Plaintiff districts generally have experienced rapid
growth and development. Skeen, slip op. at 6 ("Plaintiff districts generally consist of
lower valued residential homes, more agricultural property and less commercial and
industrial property than the Intervenor districts."). Id.
Twenty-four Minnesota Independent School Districts, representing approximately
17% of kindergarten through grade 12 enrollment, intervened. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at
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nesota Commissioner of Education and the Minnesota State Board of
Education.147
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment ruling that parts of the
Minnesota education finance system violated the Minnesota Constitution.148 The complaint alleged that their school districts had significandy less property wealth than other districts in Minnesota and thus
were able to raise less money for education.149 The plaintiffs specifically challenged the referendum and debt service levies that were
based on local property taxes1 50 and claimed that the disparities in
revenue caused a dramatic disparity in educational quality and opportunity.1 51 The gravamen of these charges was that the identified components of the Minnesota funding scheme violated the education
clause and equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution.152
The facts of this case differ from other similar state cases in that
Minnesota provides at least a minimally adequate education.15 3 Plaintiffs did not allege that they have suffered an absolute deprivation of
a quality education. Rather, they claimed that students in their school
districts received fewer educational opportunities than students in
high wealth districts, which caused a lifetime of relative
disadvantage.154
The trial court, relying on expert testimony, found that high-wealth
districts provided greater educational opportunity than low-wealth districts.155 This conclusion was based on the comparison of such criteria

301-02. Intervenor districts were generally inner-ring and second-tier suburbs with an
average property tax-base above the state average. Id. at 302. Intervenor school districts
raised significant revenue for education through local discretionary property taxes and,
in particular, through the use of referendum levies. For example, the trial court found
that 83% of the plaintiffs either had no referendum levies or raised $200 or less per
pupil unit while almost 80% of the intervenor districts had referendum levies in excess
of $600 per pupil unit. Id. at 307.
147. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 301.
148. Id. at 301.
149. Id. at 303.
150. Id. at 305-06. Plaintiffs also challenged the state aid provisions of training and
experience revenue and supplemental revenue. Id. Note that the trial court found that
training and experience revenue was constitutional. Id. at 306. This finding was not
challenged on appeal. Id.
151. Id. at 303.
152. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 301-02.
153. Id. at 302-03.
154. Id. at 303.
155. Skeen, slip op. at 96. This conclusion was supported by a study comparing seven
pairs of school districts where each pair was comprised of a low-wealth district and a
high-wealth district. Id.
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as: staffing,156 staff salaries and experience,15 7 curriculum,158 and programs offered.159
More important, the trial court concluded specifically that education is a fundamental right under the Minnesota Constitution.1 60 Further, the court found that educational funding from property wealth
or property tax-base is a suspect classification when it affects the fundamental right of education.1 61 The court found no compelling government interest served by the Minnesota school finance system funded
primarily from the local school district tax-base, namely, the referendum levy, supplemental revenue and debt service levy. 162 Finally, the
court concluded that the finance components of the school finance
system "facilitated and perpetuated" wealth-based disparities in educational opportunity among Minnesota school districts and resulted in
an absence of uniformity in kindergarten through grade twelve
1 63
education.
The trial, lasting for sixty-seven days, was the longest civil trial in the
history of Minnesota.1 64 On December 19, 1991, the Wright County
District Court Judge issued a 211-page decision which concluded that
Minnesota's funding for kindergarten through grade twelve education
violated the Minnesota Constitution by creating disparities in educational opportunity.165 The State of Minnesota and the intervenors

appealed. 166
156. Id. The trial court went on to find, "[s]taffing differences result in differences
in educational opportunity." Id. at 101. The pupil-staff ratio is a primary factor in assessing the quality of the education within a school district. Id. High tax-base districts
routinely had superior staffing ratios when compared to low tax-base districts. Id. at
103.
157. Id. at 105-07. The trial court found that high tax-base districts pay their staff
more than the low tax-base districts. Id. at 106. Also, the high tax-base districts generally hired teachers with greater experience than the low tax-base districts. Id.
158. Id. at 107. The legislative auditor studied high school curricula among Minnesota school districts and found substantial variation based, in large part, on the financial
resources available to school districts. Id. Districts with large referendum levies offered
a broader curriculum than other districts. Id.
159. Skeen, slip op. at 108-09. High-wealth districts were found to offer more advanced placement courses and a "richer array" of courses in such areas as foreign languages, advanced science courses, summer school and gifted and talented programs.
Id.
160. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 302. The trial court heard extensive testimony from 35
witnesses and reviewed over 450 exhibits. Skeen, slip op. at 146.
161. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 302.
162. Skeen, slip op. at 146.
163. Id. at 146-47.
164. Id. at 1. The court's decision was supported by 409 paragraphs of factual findings and fifty "summary findings." See id. 1-145.
165. Id.
166. The State of Minnesota and the intervenors separately appealed the decision to
the court of appeals. The court of appeals consolidated the appeals and certified the
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The Court's Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court chose to analyze the issues raised in
Skeen separately. First, it addressed whether the present education financing system, in general, and the referendum levy statute, in particular, was constitutional under the education clause of the Minnesota
Constitution.16 7 Second, it determined whether the challenged stat168
utes were constitutional under Minnesota's equal protection clause.
The court began its analysis of the first issue by evaluating the structure and history of the education clause.169 Constitutional history provided little guidance because the original drafts of the education
clause did not contain the current requirement of "general and uniform,"170 system of public schools. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
arguments and articulated two reasons supporting the constitutionality
of the education financing system.1 71 The first reason was that the
'general and uniform" language should be read broadly. The second
reason focused on the relatively small disparity in funding which was
72
only six to seven percent.1
The court looked to its own precedent as well as that of other jurisdictions for a workable definition of the word "uniform." An earlier
Minnesota case, Curyer v. Merrill, stated that the uniformity contemplated by the constitution relates to the system which the legislature
may provide and not to the district organizations established under
it. 173 Similarly, other state courts' interpretations of the word "uniform" in relation to education applied only to the general system, not
to funding disparities.1 74 Further, the Skeen court specifically noted
that "uniform" did not mean "identical" in the context of the plain
5
reading of the education clause. 17
matter to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Certification was accepted. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d
at 302.
167. Id. at 308.
168. Id. at 312.
169. Id. at 308.
170. Id. at 309. See also supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
171. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 310.
172. Id. at 309-10.
173. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 6 (1878).
174. The court specifically focused on the following Oregon, Idaho and Wisconsin
school finance decisions: Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976) (holding that the
"uniform" language is complied with if the state requires and provides for a minimum
of educational opportunities); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 652 (Idaho 1975)
(holding that a "general and uniform" system is one which, within reasonable constitutional limits of equality, makes ample provision for the education of all); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577-78 (Wis. 1989) (stating that "uniform" referred to such
items as minimum standards for teacher certification, minimal number of school days
and standard school curriculum).
175. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 311. The court also noted similar interpretations of"thorough and efficient." Id. at 310.
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The adequacy of Minnesota's overall level of education was also a
determining factor in finding the financing system constitutional.1 76
The court distinguished the Skeen situation by noting that, in every
state where an educational system was held to be unconstitutional,
there were inadequacies of the basic funding scheme that created deficiencies in education.177 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the basic system was inadequate or that an interpretation of the "general and uniform" language required full equalization of local referendum levies.178 The court specifically noted that
inequities, if they exist, do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.179

The second issue addressed by the court was the plaintiffs' claim that
the funding scheme violated the Minnesota equal protection clause.18 0
More specifically, the issue was whether education is a fundamental
right under the Minnesota Constitution or whether plaintiffs were a
suspect class. The ultimate issue, therefore, was whether the referendum levy would survive the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.] 81
In this phase of its analysis, the court first addressed the issue of
education as a fundamental right. 182 The court acknowledged that education was not a fundamental right under federal case law,18 3 but
noted that education "may still be a fundamental right or constitutional entitlement" under the Minnesota Law. 18 4 The trial court based
its ruling that education was a fundamental right on the explicit language of the education clause, the implicit recognition in the constitution of the important role of education, and the critical role of
176. Id. at 311.
177. Id. at 311-12. The court specifically reviewed the following decisions: Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the overall
system of education funding was inadequate, nonuniform and discriminatory to 80% of
schoolchildren); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 686 (Mont. 1989)
(finding that funding disparities, as high as eight to one, were determinative in holding
that the state had failed to adequately fund the foundation program); Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359, 370 (N.J. 1990) (finding that poor urban districts received inadequate
education and that a funding mechanism would equalize only 64% of districts, even if
fully funded); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989)
(finding that state funding accounted for only 42% of overall funding where local district per pupil spending varied from $2,112 to $19,333); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
585 P.2d 71, 98-99 (Wash. 1978) (finding that the complaining district was required to
raise 37.7% of revenue through special levy and, thus, the "general and uniform" requirement was not satisfied because funding for the basic education was not derived
from "dependable and regular" tax sources).
178. Sheen, 505 N.W.2d at 312.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 313.
183. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313.
184. Id.
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education "in supporting the vitality of other civil liberties contained
in the bill of rights of article I of the Minnesota Constitution."185 Relying on State v. GraylS'6 and the explicit language of the education
clause, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that educa7
tion is a fundamental right under the Minnesota Constitution.18
The supreme court deviated from the lower court decision, however,

by holding that the plaintiffs do not qualify as a suspect class.18 8 The
court distinguished Skeen from other cases where courts found a suspect class by noting that "[i] n those cases ... the apparent disparities
were far greater than the present case and the plaintiffs were relatively
powerless, thereby facilitating a 'suspect class' finding."18 9
Consistent with its holding that education is a fundamental right
under the Minnesota Constitution, the court elected to apply a strict
scrutiny analysis.' 90 However, it did not apply strict scrutiny to the issue as a whole. Rather, the court looked to the original structure and
text of the education clause and applied a strict scrutiny standard to its
analysis of the Minnesota education system; it applied a rational basis
test to the financing system.19 1
The court found that Minnesota's education system withstood a
strict scrutiny analysis. 192 Reasoning that the plaintiffs receive an adequate education and that the same amount of funding is provided to
each student under the equalization process, the court noted that "the
185. Sheen, slip op. at 179.
186. 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987).
187. Sheen, 505 N.W.2d at 313. The court found further support for its finding of a
fundamental right in the strong language of the education clause which states "it is the
duty of the legislature." Id. The court noted that the education clause was the only
place in the constitution where this phrase is used. Id.
188. Id. at 314.
189. Id. The court specifically distinguished Sheen from the following holdings: Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding that "discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth involves a suspect classification");
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980) (holding
that a classification on the basis of wealth is considered suspect, especially when applied
to fundamental interests such as education).
190. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 314-15.
191. Id. at 315. The court stated:
The fact that the drafters distinguished between the creation and financing of
the education system provides a constitutional basis for distinguishing between
the establishment of a general and uniform system of public schools and the financingofthose schools. Thus, the evidence indicates that while strict scrutiny
analysis should be applied in determining whether the legislature has met a
student's fundamental right to a general and uniform system of public schools,
a lesser standard, such as a rational basis test, should apply to the determination of whether the financing of such a system is "thorough and efficient."
Id.
192. Id. at 315.
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state has satisfied its constitutionally-imposed duty of creating a 'general and uniform system of education.' "193
The state's system of financing education also passed constitutional
muster. Applying the less rigorous two-step rational basis test, the
court found that "[t]he state has a legitimate interest in encouraging
local districts to supplement the basic revenue component, and allowing localities to augment the state contribution is rationally related
to furthering this goal . ..."194
C. A Divided Court
1.

Concurrence

The decision by the court was split. In a special concurrence,Justice
Tomljanovich noted that where a fundamental right is at issue, strict
scrutiny analysis, and not a rational basis test, should be applied. 195
However, she found that because the state provides the same amount
of funding for each student, the standard of strict scrutiny analysis was
satisfied. 196
2. Dissent
Justice Page,joined by Justice Gardebring, dissented.1 9 7 The dissent
stated that the "state's duty toward its children is not satisfied unless it
provides equal educational opportunities for all children."19 8 The dissent further argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to all aspects
of analysis where a fundamental right is at issue.' 99 The dissent noted
that "[t]he court goes to great lengths to distinguish the fundamental
right to an education from education funding, but there is no meaningful distinction between the two." 200 In closing, the dissent points
out that the court's decision "ensures that some of our children will be
20
less prepared than others for the difficult issues of the future." 1

IV. ANALYsis
Skeen v. State202 is a historic case for Minnesota. The trial lasted for
sixty-seven days, rendering it the longest civil trial in Minnesota's history. 203 It involved fifty-two school districts joined together as plain193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 316.
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring specially).
Id.
Id. at 320-22 (Page & Gardebring, B., dissenting).
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 322.
Id.
505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
203. Id. at 301.
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with the goal of improving the education of the children
residing within their borders. The trial court issued 409 findings of
fact and fifty summary findings in support of its ruling that the scheme
205
Minnesota chooses to fund its public schools is unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the list of attributes and accolades ends here. Skeen
v. StateQo6 will ultimately be remembered as a missed opportunity by
the Minnesota Supreme Court to provide an equal opportunity education to all Minnesota schoolchildren, regardless of where they happen
to reside.
This analysis argues that the supreme court had ample opportunities
to affirm the lower court's findings.
tiffs204

A.

ConstitutionalInterpretation of the Education Clause

Consistent with its own precedent, the Minnesota Supreme Court is
directed to consider the modern day changes in education as compared to the conditions at the time of the clause's adoption when in20 7
terpreting the constitutional history of the education clause.
Education today is far different from that envisioned by the Framers of
the Minnesota Constitution. 2 08 In 1857, education was often provided
in one-room school houses and the children often stayed in the community after they graduated. 209 Today, the scenario is much different.
Children will be expected to compete on a global basis.2 10 Foreign
language and computer skills are critical. However, programs providing these skills are not always available to children who live in school
districts with low tax-bases because of the unavailability of discretionary
funding. Thus, the meaning of "general and uniform," as adopted by
the Framers in drafting the education clause, should be construed in
light of today's educational demands. "Uniform" today means equal
funding for equal educational opportunities for all schoolchildren.
Moreover, the effectiveness of the equalization plan, on which the
court so heavily relied to support its finding of uniformity, 2 11 is diminished by allowing supplementation outside the basic plan. As previously noted, the Minnesota Legislature has developed a sophisticated
funding scheme to incorporate minimum levels of funding, per pupil
expenditures, and equalization.2 1 2 The effectiveness, however, is defeated by allowing additional resources, such as the referendum levy,
204. Id.

205. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
See, e.g., State v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410 (1928).
Skeen, slip op. at 166.
Id.
Id.
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 318.
See supra part II.A.2.
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to be allocated.213 Equalization formulas can be recalculated ad infinitum, but the formulas become meaningless when arbitrary lump sums
are added to the carefully structured equalization plans. By "merely
allow[ing] localities to augment this basic amount,"214 the court defeated the purpose of equalization and, ultimately, the constitutional
mandate of uniformity.
B.

The Equal Protection Analysis and Illogic of Bifurcation

The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held that education is a
fundamental right guaranteed to all children by the Minnesota Constitution.215 The majority of the court, however, departed from established legal precedent when it failed to apply a strict scrutiny standard
of judicial review to the education clause in full. Instead, the court
bifurcated its analysis to achieve a desired result. The court affirmed
the importance of education in Minnesota by declaring that it is a fundamental right and properly applied a strict scrutiny analysis. 216 The
court, however, separated the funding of public schools from the system
of public schools.217 Consequently, the financing of the schools was
held to a mere rational basis standard of review. 2 18 Declaring education a fundamental right while holding the present financing scheme
of the public schools constitutional is transparently result-oriented. As
Justice Page points out in the dissent, "there is no meaningful distinction between the two."219
Employing a rational basis standard of review, the court held that
the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging local districts to supplement the basic revenue component. 220 To reach this same outcome under a strict scrutiny analysis, however, the court would need to
support the state's compelling interest in allowing more money to be
spent on some student's educations simply because they live in wealthy
school districts. One might ask how the state can have a compelling
government interest in discriminating against some children while not
others. The answer is patently obvious-the state cannot maintain this
interest. There is no compelling state interest served by funding systems that further such disparities.
213. See McUsic, supra note 84, at 319 n.47.
214. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 318.
215. Id. at 314.
216. Id. at 315.

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 322.
220. Id. at 318.
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C. Even If Bifurcated, DisparateImpact in Education FundingEarns a
Russell Heightened Rational Basis Standard of Review
Further, Minnesota's financing scheme is unconstitutional, even
under the heightened rational basis level of scrutiny articulated in State
v. Russell.221 The Skeen court ruled that education is a fundamental
right guaranteed to all Minnesota school children by the state constitution. Given the importance of education, the court should have
granted less deference to the legislature than that which is traditionally
limited to cases of economic legislation. Using the three-part rational
basis test articulated in Russell, the court would have concluded that
there is no genuine or substantial basis for treating a child differently
based on the property wealth of the child's school district. Further,
there is no meaningful or logical reason for distinguishing between
schoolchildren based on property tax structures. Finally, discrimination based on wealth is not a legitimate purpose that the state should
attempt to achieve. The court, however, followed the traditional twopart federal rational basis test to conclude that there is a legitimate
interest in encouraging revenue for education and the financing
scheme adopted furthers this goal. 222
Clearly, the state's financing scheme fails both a strict scrutiny analysis and Minnesota's own heightened rational basis standard of review.
D. Social Policy of Education
The state's competing interests of equality, efficiency, and local control of education2 23 lie at the heart of the Skeen decision. Equality balances one end of the scale while efficiency and local control fall at the
other. By allowing continued use of the referendum levy to finance
public education, the court let the scale tip in favor of local control
and efficiency at the expense of equality.
The dissent cogently summarizes the effect of the court's disservice
to equality by stating that "[t]he court's decision today ensures that
some of our children will be less prepared than others for the difficult
issues of the future."224 Recent studies lend support to this conclusion.
At trial, one expert witness presented evidence of his study of fourteen Minnesota school districts. 225 The study matched high-wealth
districts with low-wealth districts 226 to conclude that a consistent advantage in educational opportunity existed for students attending school
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 316.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 306.
Id.
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in the high-wealth districts.227 Logically, this is supported by the fact
that greater. resources provide greater educational opportunity. 228
A recent study performed by the Harvard Project on School Desegregation noted that several state courts have found that state finance
formulas have helped create separate but equal schools.229 The study
found that the number of African-American and Hispanic students
that attend "predominantly minority" schools is rising, thus reversing
the effort of school desegregation.230 The report concluded that the
educational system perpetuates the educational inequality of minority
23
students. 1
A recent proposal has addressed the need for desegregation in the
Minnesota public school system.2 3 2 The proposal seeks to eliminate
the gap between minority and white students in academic achievement
levels by allowing children from districts with fifty percent or more minority students to enroll in other districts just as if their families had
moved there. 233 This proposal identifies and attempts to address the
inequality in educational opportunity that currently exists in our public school system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Skeen v. State234 signifies
tolerance for wealth-based disparities that lead to inequities in educational opportunity for some of Minnesota's schoolchildren. Unfortunately, there are wide-ranging policy implications and costs for our
schoolchildren that extend far beyond the case at hand. As of this
date, the future of equal opportunity education in Minnesota is legally
certain-it is available for children fortunate enough to live in a
wealthy school district, but permissibly unavailable for others.
Kathleen Smith Ruhland
227. Skeen, slip op. at 96.
228. Id. at 100.
229. William Celis, Study FindsRising Concentration of Black and HispanicStudents, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al, All.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Laurie Blake, Desegregation Plan Would Include Suburbs: State Proposal Envisions
Metrowide Magnet Schools, STAR TRIB., (Mpls.) Jan. 11, 1994, at 1A, 6A.
233. Id.
234. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
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